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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a reasoning framework to diagnose 
faults at the vehicle level in a complex machine like an 
aircraft. The current focus of Integrated Vehicle Health 
Management (IVHM) is on diagnosing and prognosing faults 
at the component and subsystem levels; only a few IVHM 
systems consider the interaction between the systems. To 
diagnose faults at the vehicle level, an IVHM System needs 
a framework that recognizes the causal relationships between 
systems and the likelihood of fault propagation between 
them. The framework should also possess an element of 
reasoning to assess data from all systems, to assign priorities, 
and to resolve ambiguities. The Framework for Aerospace 
VEhicle Reasoning (FAVER) that is proposed in this paper 
uses a Digital Twin (DT) of the aircraft systems to emulate 
functioning of the aircraft and to simulate the effect of fault 
propagation due to systems interactions. FAVER applies 
reasoning that can handle fault signatures from multiple 
systems in the form of symptom vectors, to detect and isolate 
cascading faults and their root causes. The blending of a DT 
and reasoning in this framework will enable FAVER to: i) 
isolate faults that have both local and cascading effects on the 
concerned systems, ii) identify faults that were previously 
unknown, and iii) resolve ambiguous faults. This paper 
explains the different steps involved in developing FAVER 
and how this framework can be demonstrated in the 
aforementioned scenarios with the help of different use cases. 
This paper also talks about the challenges to be faced while 
developing this framework and ways to overcome them. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Any aerospace vehicle, like an aircraft, is a complex machine 
comprising various multi-physical systems, each having 
functions and objectives of their own. These systems interact 
with each other at different levels to attain full functionality 
of the aircraft (Ezhilarasu, 2018). In general, the aircraft 
systems are built in such a way that they remain stand-alone 
to a greater degree, to avoid unnecessary complexities. Still, 
due to the interactions between systems, it is not uncommon 
for a fault arising from one system to propagate and affect 
another system that the former is interacting with. Such 
cascading faults, whose paths are already known, are isolated 
in maintenance and troubleshooting activities. This is 
sometimes performed with aircraft maintenance systems like 
Honeywell’s Prime Epic Aircraft Diagnostic Maintenance 
Systems (ADMS) (Scandura, Christensen, Lutz, & Bird, 
2011). However, when a fault propagation takes a new/ 
unexpected path and affects multiple systems, it cannot be 
isolated easily during maintenance. One such real-world 
incident is the engine rollback of a Boeing 777 at Heathrow 
airport in 2008 (Sleight & Carter, 2014). During the 
investigation, the reason behind the engine rollback was 
found to be a drop in its power due to restricted fuel flow to 
both the engines. Further root cause analysis found that the 
fuel remained in the ‘sticky’ temperature range (less than -
10oC) for a prolonged period of time; this resulted in ice 
formation, which in turn was released in the fuel feed pipe 
and blocked the fuel oil heat exchanger and the rest of the fuel 
lines. Another such example is the emergency evacuation of 
a Fokker F28 in 2002, due to smoke in the cabin (Conradi, 
2015). The investigation found that it was due to a crack in 
the Auxiliary Power Unit’s compressor blade, the debris 
eventually causing a crack in an oil seal and resulting in oil 
spray in the bleed valve, leading to smoke in the cabin 
(Conradi, 2015).  
In cases like the abovementioned incidents, which are met 
with unexpected failure propagation involving multiple 
aircraft systems, troubleshooting is not a straight forward 
activity, and it results in extended downtime. Any Integrated 
Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) System that attempts 
diagnosing such cascading faults requires a holistic view of 
the aircraft, and the micro effects (confined to a system) and 
macro effects (affecting the system in addition to the system 
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of origin) of the interactions between the various systems 
(A.N.Srivatsava, R.W.Mah, R.Bharadwaj, & 
D.Mylaraswamy, 2013). The current focus of IVHM systems 
involve automated procedures focused at Line Replacement 
Units (LRUs) and subsystems level, but there are very few 
research publications that consider ‘vehicle level’ as their 
primary driver (Ezhilarasu, Skaf, & Jennions, 2019). This 
paper proposes a framework that aims to isolate the cascading 
faults affecting multiple systems of the aircraft. The 
Framework for Aerospace VEhicle Reasoning, also known as 
FAVER, incorporates the concept of a Digital Twin (DT) to 
produce simulations of what-if scenarios between the aircraft 
systems, along with an element of reasoning, to investigate 
data from the concerned systems and to isolate the root cause 
of cascaded faults. 
2. FAVER FUNDAMENTALS 
FAVER is a proposed framework for isolating faults in 
aircraft systems, particularly a fault or degradation in one 
system that affects another. FAVER comprises of two 
components: i) Digital Twin (DT) and ii) Reasoning. The 
following subsections present the background of both 
elements and explain how they will fit together to enable 
FAVER to isolate cascading faults in different scenarios. 
2.1. Digital Twin (DT) 
A DT is a virtual representation of any physical or functional 
asset that helps in monitoring the performance of the asset for 
a variety of outcomes like efficiency, health, or lifecycle cost. 
The term ‘Digital Twin’ was first coined by Dr. Michael 
Grieves from the University of Michigan in 2002, to mean a 
virtual/digital representation of any physical asset (Grieves, 
2016). NASA brought the concept of DT into the aerospace 
field in 2012, to integrate the simulation with on-board 
IVHM systems, along with historical maintenance and fleet 
data to represent its exact physical twin for further analysis 
(Glaessgen & Stargel, 2012). Over the last decade, the 
application of the DT has expanded, due to the abundance of 
data produced by the physical systems and the digitization of 
data collection and processing. In the field of IVHM, the DT 
has been applied for anomaly detection, predictive and 
prescriptive analysis and operation optimization (Auweraer, 
2018; General Electric, 2016; The Aerospace Technology 
Institute, 2017).  
By the definition of the DT, it is evident that it is, at its core, 
a simulation model of any physical asset, and that it functions 
as a living model and provides results based on its 
application. For a given instance, in the case of predictive 
analysis in IVHM, the DT can provide simulation results of 
the system’s remaining life and, in the case of manufacturing, 
it can give the results required for operation optimization. 
When extended to the field of health monitoring, the DT is 
capable of producing what-if scenarios to understand the 
hidden relationship between the systems; it is this capability 
of the DT which will be useful to the proposed framework for 
isolating cascading faults. FAVER uses the DT, as it can 
establish the interaction between the systems and enable 
simulations of a healthy state as well as possible fault 
propagations between the systems. 
2.2. Reasoning 
Reasoning is a systematic methodology for problem-solving 
by using the application of logic and cognition. There are a 
variety of reasoning strategies such as deduction, induction, 
abduction, analogical and temporal reasoning, which are 
applied depending upon the data available to solve problems 
(Ezhilarasu et al., 2019). A reasoning system is a software 
system that employs reasoning strategies in a systematic 
‘input-process-output’ manner. In the field of aerospace 
IVHM, several reasoning systems have been developed to 
monitor the systems health (Bunus, Isaksson, Frey, & 
Münker, 2009; Gaudette & Alwardt, 2006; Park et al., 2004; 
Sebastian, Peripinayagam, Jennions, & Alghassi, 2016). 
Reasoning is required in IVHM systems for many roles such 
as analyzing data from multiple sources, isolating the root 
cause of any faults, helping in decision-making processes, 
resolving ambiguities, detecting anomalies and upgrading 
diagnostic accuracies. Reasoning is an invaluable component 
for developing IVHM systems for vehicle level health 
monitoring (Ezhilarasu et al., 2019).   
In order to diagnose faults at the vehicle level, FAVER 
requires the reasoning element to meet with the following 
objectives: i) to process data from multiple aircraft systems, 
ii) to assess information, iii) set priorities, iv) resolve 
conflicts, v) pass judgement on the possible root causes of 
any fault, and vi) to update FAVER’s knowledge of any new 
fault that affects a system. 
2.3. The synergy between the Digital Twin and 
Reasoning 
The proposed framework, FAVER combines the versatility 
of a Digital Twin (DT) with the power of reasoning, in such 
a way that both these components compensate for each 
other’s lacking. A DT could emulate the functioning of an 
aircraft through simulations of its systems at healthy and 
faulty (or degraded) states; yet, the output from such 
simulations require further intense analysis and intelligence 
to isolate the root cause of the fault from the data produced. 
On the contrary, reasoning in a health monitoring system is 
only as effective as its domain knowledge either in the form 
of expert systems, models or datasets. Hence, FAVER aims 
to make use of the synergy between the ability of a DT to 
emulate the effects of fault propagation between the aircraft 
systems and reasoning’s ability to investigate the data 
produced to isolate the root cause of the fault propagation. 
This blending of DT and reasoning will enable FAVER to:  
i) isolate faults that have both local and cascading effects 
on the concerned aircraft systems,  
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ii) identify faults that were previously unknown, and  
iii) resolve ambiguous faults. 
3. FAVER METHODOLOGY 
Figure 1 shows the schematic of the proposed framework. 
The schematic is represented with two main layers, viz, i) The 
Digital Twin layer (bottom of figure 1), and ii) the Reasoning 
layer (top of figure 1). The two intermediate layers in figure 
1 represent the system level diagnostics and fault detection 
layers. Each vertical in figure 1 represents the modules 
required from each system, contributing to reasoning at the 
top level.  
Consider the Fuel System, the Engine, the Environmental 
Control System (ECS) and the Electrical Power System 
(EPS) of an aircraft (as shown in the bottom-most layer of 
figure 1). These systems have functions of their own and part 
of their functions that involve interacting with the other 
systems. For illustration, the fuel system provides fuel to the 
engine, the engine provides bleed air to the ECS and shaft 
power required for the EPS, and the EPS provides electric 
power to the components in the fuel system, the engine and 
the ECS. These systems interactions are considered for 
emulating the interactions in an aircraft via DT within 
FAVER. Besides, the EPS is also chosen to add a multi-
physical dimension to the problem chosen. The DT can be a 
physics-based or a function-based model, or it can be a 
Hardware-in-the-loop or a data-driven representation as well.  
The second horizontal layer from the bottom in figure 1 
represents the number of fault modes being considered at the 
system level. These fault modes degrade the systems from its 
100% healthy state to degraded or faulty states. Only a 
limited number of fault modes are taken into account for the 
initial setup of the framework, as FAVER aims to 
demonstrate its capability of isolating a certain number of 
fault modes with a broader range of systems rather than 
focusing on a large number of fault modes only from a few 
systems. The third horizontal layer from the bottom in figure 
1 shows that each system has its own diagnostics for the 
determined fault modes. These systems diagnostics are fed by 
sensor data from the DT for isolation of local fault with micro 
effects. They are incorporated in FAVER’s schematic so as 
to contribute to overall reasoning at the vehicle level. 
The reasoning is built on the diagnostic capability of the 
systems and their interactions. The reasoning module has 
access to both sensor data and diagnostic information from 
the systems. The knowledge is stored in the form of a 
symptom vector (sensor readings from each system), and any 
fault injected that affects one or more systems is isolated as a 
‘known fault’, with the help of built-in knowledge about the 
interacting functions of the systems.  
In figure 1, it is to be noted that the right-most vertical for the 
electrical power system does not possess any diagnostic 
module. This is to test FAVER for its ability to isolate faults 
that are previously unknown, as it is impractical to assume 
that reasoning in any health monitoring system is aware of all 
possible faults that might affect the systems. Consider a 
scenario where a fault signature is introduced in the EPS and 
it affects another system like the fuel system. Since the top-
level reasoning module depends upon the sensor data and 
system diagnostic information for isolating faults, this fault 
injected in the EPS will not be detected as a ‘known fault’ 
Figure 1: The schematic of FAVER 
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right away by reasoning. In general, the maintenance 
engineers will have to troubleshoot and isolate such a fault 
manually, since it will go unnoticed or misclassified by any 
diagnostic system. However, in this case, instead of 
misidentifying the electrical fault as ‘no fault’ or 
misclassifying it as a fault in the fuel system, FAVER would 
use the EPS DT with suitable virtual sensors to identify the 
combination of parameters that would lead to the injected 
fault signature. This fault signature can then be added to 
reasoning’s knowledge module with the electrical fault as its 
new label.  
The EPS DT is also used by FAVER to flag ambiguity. This 
is especially useful for the interacting systems, as many 
mechanical faults have similar symptoms as the electrical 
faults. As the EPS supplies power to many components in 
multiple systems, it is possible that fault symptoms occurring 
due to degradation in the EPS are ambiguous with mechanical 
degradations. In such cases, there is a risk of misclassifying 
a fault mode as a mechanical fault when it was originally an 
electrical fault. Using the EPS DT, FAVER will be able to 
reverse engineer the fault symptoms that match with the 
mechanical fault modes, to check if they can also be produced 
by the electrical parameters. When a suitable combination of 
parameters which could lead to the symptom (that matches 
with the mechanical fault), ambiguity will be flagged for that 
fault, and the reasoning’s knowledge module will be updated.  
4. DEVELOPMENT OF FAVER 
FAVER is being developed through four stages, as shown in 
Figure 2: i) Use-case Conceptualization, ii) Development of 
the building blocks, iii) Implementation and Testing, and iv) 
Evaluation. This section talks about the different steps 
involved in each stage of development.  
Stage 1: Use case Conceptualization 
This initial stage involves conceptualization of use cases that 
will be demonstrated through FAVER. The use cases are 
defined in such a way that the overall objectives of FAVER 
are satisfied through the demonstration. The cases of isolating 
single (system-level) and cascading faults (vehicle-level) that 
are previously known and unknown are framed into a number 
of distinct scenarios (as shown in table 1) for which the use 
cases are defined. These scenarios will enable demonstration 
of FAVER to isolate faults that affect a system locally, at a 
Figure 2: Stages in developing FAVER 
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micro scale as well as those that have a macro effect on other 
systems. It is to be noted that, for a fault mode that is 
previously unknown, its interaction effect cannot possibly be 
known and thus, the sixth case in table 1 is also not possible. 
 
The use cases will be formed for the remaining scenarios in 
table 1 and ambiguity can be checked for the known faults. 
The use cases (faults to be injected) are chosen from the 
scenarios from table 1, with reference to the four systems 
considered in the FAVER schematic (figure 1) that emulate 
the interaction between the systems of an aircraft. The faults 
chosen for demonstration can either be a single fault affecting 
a local system or a cascading fault that has a macro effect on 
another system. 
For example, consider figure 3. A reduced AC supply to a 
motor pump in the fuel system has its origin in EPS. 
However, this fault in the EPS has a cascading effect, which 
is to reduce the power to the motor pump, which in turn 
affects the fuel delivery to the engine and results in reduced 
power from the engine (redundancy is not considered in the 
use cases for demonstration purposes). This ‘domino effect’ 
has its root cause, the reduced AC supply from the EPS, and 
this fault can be flagged as one with a macro effect. This 
example can be used to check multiple use case scenarios like 
i) known fault with known interaction effect, ii) known fault 
with new interaction effect, and iii) new fault with a new 
interaction effect. Similar examples are being formulated to 
test the capability of fault isolation by FAVER.  
For the use case scenarios of a known single fault and a new 
single fault, faults injected at the system level can be chosen 
and tested. Ambiguity can be introduced in the system by 
injecting faults in components like valves. For example, a 
sticking valve in the fuel system can be a mechanical fault, 
and also a result of a stuck relay that reduces the voltage 
supplied to power the valve. The symptom vector for a 
sticking valve will be the same, despite the cause. Introducing 
such ambiguity could showcase the ability of FAVER to 
resolve such faults. When the use cases are defined, health 
parameters to be monitored will be decided, and the domain 
knowledge required for that use case are collected. 
Stage 2: Development of the building blocks 
This stage involves the development of the Digital Twin (DT) 
of the systems and the corresponding diagnostic reasoning at 
both system and vehicle level. For example, when the fuel 
system DT is built with respect to its source model, faults to 
be injected are defined, sensors to isolate faults are 
established and the parameters required for interaction with 
the EPS and the engine to demonstrate one of the use case 
scenarios are defined. In parallel, the fuel system diagnostics 
with isolation algorithms is built at the systems level and the 
knowledge base in the form of symptom vector is populated 
for reasoning at the vehicle level.  
Stage 3: Implementation and Testing 
The third stage of developing FAVER involves 
implementation and testing. In this stage, the DT of a system 
is run in a healthy condition, followed by fault injection and 
data collection. The symptom vector generated is compared 
with the knowledge base of reasoning to identify whether the 
fault is previously known. If no matches are found, the DT is 
used to check if any other system is the root cause of the 
injected fault, resulting in a previously unknown or 
ambiguous fault. Stage 2 and Stage 3 are repeated for 
building the DT and diagnostics for all four systems shown 
in figure 1. The reasoning module at the vehicle level is 
expanded to accommodate the different domain knowledge 
and suitable isolation algorithms. 
Stage 4: Evaluation 
Once all the systems are accounted for, in terms of the DT, 
their interactions, system level diagnostics, and top-level 
reasoning, FAVER will be evaluated for the performance 
metrics like classification accuracy, misclassification rate, 
number of false positives and false negatives and the time 
taken for classification. It will also be tested for its scalability 
and its sustainability to add or remove an aircraft system 
module to the framework. 
5. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
A thought experiment was conducted with an experimental 
fuel rig to understand the interdependencies between various 
systems. The idea is to develop a conceptual model of how 
the reasoning is going to be demonstrated, while keeping the 
logic tractable. Too complex and the logic won’t be traceable 
Fault 
Mode 
Interaction 
Effect 
Use Case Scenario Effect
-scale 
Known - Known Single Fault Micro 
Known Known Known fault, known 
Interaction Effect 
Macro 
Known Unknown Known fault, new 
interaction effect 
Macro 
Unknown - New Single Fault Micro 
Unknown Unknown New fault, new 
interaction effect 
Macro 
Unknown Known Not Possible  
Table 1: Use Case Scenarios 
Figure 3: An example of a system fault with macro effect 
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or obvious, too simple and it won’t be effective as a 
framework. With the help of this thought experiment, a 
number of assumptions are seen to be necessary for the initial 
demonstration of FAVER.  
The fuel rig on which the thought experiment was conducted 
was developed in the IVHM lab in Cranfield University 
(Yufei Lin, 2017) and is representative of a commercial 
aircraft fuel system. Consider figure 4, where a small 
mechanical layout from the rig is presented for this thought 
experiment. Figure 4 can be seen to involve seven different 
layers. The mechanical system (hardware layer) consists of a 
reservoir from which the fuel is pumped by a gear pump GP, 
powered by a motor M, and it passes through a shutoff valve 
and filter F, followed by a flow control valve V, and back to 
the reservoir. There are four pressure sensors (S1, S2, S3 & 
S4), a laser sensor L, and a flow meter FM that provide sensor 
readings from the mechanical layer to the health monitoring 
layer (topmost layer of figure 4). The electrical system is 
shown via DC and AC layers; the sensors, the flow meter, the 
flow control, and the shutoff valves are all powered by 12-24 
VDC; the motor M that drives the gear pump is supplied by 
230VAC power. The electrical layer is required for the 
functioning of the mechanical components. Similarly, the 
control system is shown in two layers, viz, control and the 
feedback layers: they consist of the control functions pump 
speed N, the valve positions and the flow Q through the 
flowmeter, and their feedbacks respectively. The fault modes 
are injected into the fuel rig via the control system. For the 
effective functioning and diagnosing of the fuel rig, it is 
essential that all the dependent systems, i.e., the mechanical 
system, the electrical power system, and the control system 
should work together, along with the sensors and flowmeters 
which connect them to the health monitoring for diagnosis. 
 
In the beginning, faults are considered only within the 
mechanical and electrical systems. Six fault modes that are 
planned to be injected are listed in table 2. Among these fault 
modes, the clogged filter (FM1) and the pipe leak (FM2) are 
mechanical faults, whereas the reduced pump speed can 
either be due to reduced electric power to the pump (FM4) or 
due to a broken gear tooth in the pump (FM3). Similarly, a 
Table 2: List of fault modes for the thought experiment 
Mode Fault Type 
FM1 Filter Clogging Mechanical 
FM2 Pipe Leaking Mechanical 
FM3 Gear tooth broken in the pump Mechanical 
FM4 Low power to the electric pump Electrical 
FM5 Clogged flow control valve Mechanical 
FM6 Low power to the flow control valve  Electrical 
Figure 4: Multiple systems in a fuel rig - A thought experiment 
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clogged nozzle may occur due to either mechanical blockage 
(FM5) or lack of electrical power (FM6).  
Since the electromechanical components used in the test rig 
are susceptible to both mechanical and electrical faults, the 
symptom vectors for such fault modes resembled each other, 
thus introducing ambiguity to the problem. The symptom 
vector matrix was developed to represent the fault signatures 
at the system level, using which the diagnostic rules were 
developed to isolate both mechanical and electrical faults. In 
the case of the control system, with respect to the fuel rig, its 
role does not stop only at controlling the valves and motor 
speed and receiving the feedback. Rather, the control system 
is essential for injecting faults into the rig for diagnosis. Thus, 
introducing faults in the control system will render the 
diagnosis of fuel rig invalid. In practice the control system 
may well mask potential faults. Hence, for demonstrating 
FAVER with the fuel rig, only mechanical and electrical 
systems are assumed to be at fault, the control system is 
considered to be healthy. The same is the case for considering 
faulty sensors. Since the health monitoring layer, the output 
of which is used for diagnosing the faults in the fuel rig, is 
dependent upon the sensor readings, for the purpose of initial 
testing, the sensor data are assumed to be reliable. In a similar 
fashion, a few more assumptions are made to define the scope 
of the research, within which FAVER will be demonstrated. 
A complete list of the assumptions made is as follows:  
1. The EPS is not instrumented for diagnostics 
2. The control system is assumed to be 100% healthy 
3. Only single faults are considered 
4. Sensors are always healthy 
5. Fault modes signatures are to be studied at steady state  
6. No False Alarms are considered 
As previously mentioned, these assumptions can be relaxed 
at the later stage, to expand the framework and prove 
FAVER’s ability to isolate faults under complex conditions.  
6. CHALLENGES 
The development of FAVER poses a number of challenges. 
In order to enable FAVER to isolate cascading faults that are 
previously known and unknown and to flag ambiguity, a 
certain number of assumptions will be made, as mentioned in 
the previous section. These, however, will not affect the 
overall ability of FAVER to isolate the faults; instead, these 
assumptions will be treated as special conditions. Future 
research will relax these assumptions.  
FAVER requires validated simulations with which to build 
the Digital Twin (DT) for emulating the systems interactions. 
Developing every system from scratch is time-consuming 
and will not fit into the timescale for completing FAVER. 
Hence the DT sources are taken from previously developed 
and validated simulation models from research work within 
the IVHM Centre. Similarly, existing diagnostic methods are 
chosen for system level diagnosis, and reasoning is developed 
only at the vehicle level to isolate the faults that have a macro 
effect on multiple systems. 
One more challenge for developing FAVER is the 
complexity involved in establishing interaction between the 
systems. As FAVER is designed to accommodate multiple 
systems, the framework must possess the required features to 
enable systems interactions at the vehicle level. If a new 
system is introduced, it must be checked for all possible 
connections with the other systems and every system 
interacting with the new one must be updated for enabling the 
interactions via DT. All the concerned systems must go 
through rigorous verification and validation to account for the 
change. For this purpose, modularity is being introduced to 
the framework’s architecture. Every system will be 
encapsulated and will be treated as an independent module. 
The interaction between the modules will be established only 
through the modules meant for communication. In this case, 
when a new system is added, the necessary parameters will 
only be updated in the communication modules and the 
sources of other systems DT will not be disturbed. It is to be 
noted that, along with the challenge of complexity and 
sustainability, the modularity feature takes care of the issues 
of scalability for the framework. Even if the systems are of 
different scales, the scaling factor can be introduced in the 
communication modules, through which the DT interactions 
can be enabled.  
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
A Framework for Aerospace Vehicle Reasoning (FAVER), 
conceptualized with its main components of Digital Twin 
(DT) and reasoning, is discussed in this paper, along with the 
different stages of development and the use case scenarios. 
Developing and demonstrating FAVER will provide a 
pathway to isolate cascading faults and resolve ambiguities 
under multiple scenarios in the aircraft systems.  
Currently, the architecture of FAVER is being designed 
systematically, to include all of the essential components. As 
most sources of aircraft systems are available for the DT from 
the IVHM Centre, they will be brought into the framework 
via the modularity feature and tested for interaction with the 
other systems. Once the interactions are established, the 
reasoning strategies will be built to isolate cascading faults 
that are previously known or unknown to the system, as well 
as to identify ambiguity, i.e., figure 1 will be executed.  
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